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patent difficulty that the facts of this case fail to show that decedent's
"drive" or "urge" to end her life was uncontrollable or irresistible.23
Despite testimony of the neuro-psychiatrist that, in his opinion,24 de-
cedent knew what she was doing but could not, resist the impulse to do it,
the fact remains that the suicide took place twenty-two months after
the accident, and after several planned attempts of the deceased to take
her life had been stymied. From this it can be seen that the decedent
had actually planned each attempt on her life by controlling the "uncon-
trollable" impulse to take her life until she was certain that no one in
her family would be home to block her attempt. Such an intelligent and
willful purpose on the part of the decedent to commit suicide is not
compatible with the idea of uncontrollable impulse.
The relation of negligence to death in the instant case would seem
to be too remote as a matter of law to justify recovery. The proximate
cause of death was decedent's suicide - her planned demise finally ac-
complished by her own act. The rationale of the present case is unsound
in that it seeks to trace the proximate cause of death through numerous
stages of mental aberration and physical suffering for twenty-two months
to the original accident. Carried to its logical conclusion, this reasoning
would impute liability to a defendant if the victim of his negligence sub-
sequently killed another, thus allowing recovery against the defendant by
the deceased's survivors. Such a course would in effect undermine the
whole concept of proximate cause and impose unlimited liability on the
negligent tortfeasor.
William F. Coyle
TRUSTS-APPORTIONMENT OF DIVIDENDS-PNNSYLVANIA RULE OF
APPORTIONMENT R9NDERED EXTINCT DUE To RETROACTIVE EFFECT
GIVEN UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcOME AT.
In Re Catherwood's Trust (Pa. 1961).
By a trust deed dated June 9, 1924, Daniel Catherwood assigned
1896.72 shares of the common stock of American Gas & Electric Co. (now
American Electric Power Co.) to the First Pennsylvania Banking and
Trust Company as trustee. The instrument provided that the trustee pay
the net income from said shares to Catherwood's two children for life, and
upon their death, to their descendants per stirpes. In 1948, two-hundred of
23. See note 4, supra.
24. See note 20, supra.
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these shares were sold by the trustee for $7808.18. Although, in terms
of book value, this sale represented a gain, the trust suffered an actual loss
by virtue of a decrease in the stock's market value between 1924 and 1948.'
The trustee was subsequently the recipient of four stock dividends: a 5%
dividend in 1951, a 21/2% dividend in 1952, a 2% dividend in 1955, and a
21/ % dividend in 1957. In 1956, the holdings of the trustee were increased
due to a "one and one-half for one" split in the corporate stock. A transfer
from the earned surplus to the capital stock account represented 61.9% of
this stock dividend, while the balance of the issue was financed by a transfer
from capital surplus. At the audit of the trustee's third account, the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County was called upon to determine to
whom and in what proportion the aforementioned dividends and proceeds
of sale should be granted. The life tenants were both still living, and, by
virtue of prior decrees, an attorney had been appointed guardian ad
litem for minors and trustee ad litem for unascertained remaindermen.
Relying upon the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment, the court decided
that the proceeds from the sale of stock and from the stock split were the
property of the remaindermen, but that the four small stock dividends must
be apportioned between the life tenants and the principal of the trust. In
so ruling, however, it urged upon the highest tribunal of the Common-
wealth a reconsideration of its earlier. decision in Crawford Estat 2 with a
view toward the relaxation of the rule therein enunciated so as to permit
the retroactive application of the Uniform Principal and Income Act3
to trusts created prior to its passage. On an appeal filed by the life
tenants, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with two justices concurring
in part and dissenting in part, held that the Uniform Principal and Income
Act, which adopted the Massachusetts Rule of Apportionment, could
constitutionally be accorded retroactive application to trusts created prior
to its enactment, and, that "in all audits now pending and henceforth,"
distributions shall be made in conformance with the provisions of that Act.
In Re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
. In those states in which shares of stock have been held in a trust under
which the income of the trust estate is payable to certain beneficiaries for
life and the principal is on their death payable to other beneficiaries, com-
plex problems often have arisen with regard to the respective rights of bene-
ficiaries to money or other property received by the trustee from the
shares. These problems have not only been the subject of much judicial
interpretation, but have served as an impetus for considerable legislative
action. In an effort to resolve these difficulties, and at the same time
maintain a reasonable balance between equity and administrative practi-
1. At the creation of the trust, the book value of the stock was $11.76 per share
and its market value was listed at $71.77. The sale of two hundred shares for
$7,808.18, therefore, amounted to a gain of $5,455.24 in book value, but a loss of
$6,546.90 in market value, that is, $14,355.08 (the market value at $71.77 per share)
less $7,808.18 (the proceeds of the sale).
2. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3470.1-.15 (Supp. 1960).
[VOL. 7
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss3/12
SPRING 1962]
cality, the various states have formulated certain rules of apportionment.
The two most significant, and the ones to which we must direct our
attention for purposes of this analysis, are the so-called Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts rules. 4 The first of these standards was enunciated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1859 in the case of Earp's 4ppeal.5 It was
at that time held that when there is a distribution of an extraordinary
cash or stock dividend, the trustee must consider that dividend income
if it was declared out of earnings which accrued to the declaring corporation
during the period of the trust. If, on the other hand, it was derived from
earnings which accrued prior to the trust's creation, the dividend must be
deemed principal. The avowed purpose of this, the Pennsylvania rule,
was to preserve the intact value of the corpus as it existed at the com-
mencement of the trust, while giving to the life tenants the income earned
thereafter.8 Although that formula has been acknowledged by the courts
to be the most equitable, 7 it has in recent years lost the favor of many
states due to complexities relative to its application. In 1931, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uni-
form Principal and Income Act which rejected the Pennsylvania rule and
adopted the more workable Massachusetts rule.8 The latter standard
was initially proclaimed in 1868 in the leading case of Minot v. Paine.,
The rule, as originally defined, provided that every cash dividend, whatever
its amount, be allocated to income, and that each stock dividend, if com-
posed of shares of the declaring corporation, be deemed principal. If the
dividend consisted of securities or shares which were not those of the
declaring corporation, the life tenants were the sole beneficiaries.10 Some
measure of this rule's acceptability can be seen by noting that, to date,
twenty-three jurisdictions have adopted the Principal and Income Act.1
In 1945, the Pennsylvania state legislature became the twelfth such
body to ratify the Uniform Principal and Income Act. By so doing, it not
4. The majority opinion in the instant case also makes note of the so-called
Kentucky rule. By virtue of both judicial and legislative action, Kentucky abandoned
that standard in the last decade. It is no longer followed by any jurisdiction in the
country.
5. 28 Pa. 368 (1859).
6. In Re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927); Earp's Appeal
28 Pa. 368 (1859).
7. In Re Estate of Fera, 26 N.J. 131, 136, 139 A.2d 23, 26 (1958); In Re
Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 75, 173 A.2d 86, 93 (1961); In Re Nirdlinger's
Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 472, 139 Atl. 200, 206 (1927).
8. A further indication of that trend can be seen by noting that the American
Law Institute, which had originally adopted the Pennsylvania rule in its Restate-
ment of Trusts, abandoned that formula in favor of the Massachusetts standard
in 1948. RnSTAUM-NT, TRUSTs 236(b) (Supp. 1948).
9. 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
10. Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Sherwood, 110 Conn. 150, 147 Atl.
562 (1929) (bonds held in surplus were distributed to stockholders); Whiting v.
Hagey, 366 Ill. 86, 7 N.E.2d 885 (1937) (stock of another corporation); Creed v.
McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761 (1931) (dividend consisted of another
corporation's stock).
11. Many of the states have adopted the Act only after changing certain of its
provisions. For a list of those jurisdictions in which the Act is currently in effect,
see, 9B UNnI. LAws AN., p. 87 (Supp. 1961).
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only abandoned the principles which were first stated in Earp's Appeal
and thereafter developed by the courts of the Commonwealth, but it also
introduced certain problems with respect to the scope of the new law.
Those problems provide the basis for the present discussion. It is clear
that the legislators intended that the 1945 Act be applied retroactively,
i.e., to those trusts created prior to the date of passage, as well as to those
that would thereafter come into being.12 That intention was thwarted,
however, when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Crawford
Estate's that to give such effect to the statute would be a violation of both
state and federal due process. The court reasoned that the decisional law
embodying the Pennsylvania rule established in the life tenant a vested prop-
erty right in the accumulated unpaid earnings and profits of the corporation.
In 1947, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the second Principal and
Income Act1 4 which, while repealing its predecessor, substantially re-
enacted the latter's provisions,15 including the one calling for the law's
retroactive application. The highest court was not yet prepared to shelve
its constitutional objections and consequently reaffirmed its Crawford de-
cision on a number of subsequent occasions. 16 The instant case represents
the court's initial break from that precedent. In finding that the legislatively
adopted rule can validly be applied to trusts created prior to its enactment,
the court has rejected the proposition that the life tenants have a vested
interest in the accumulated unpaid earnings of the corporation or in any
particular apportionment formula for the ascertainment of such earnings.
In the absence of that vested interest, it has held that judicial enforcement
must be afforded the legislative mandate.17
12. Section 17 of the Act provided that the provisions should apply to all trusts
"theretofore or thereafter made or created." (Emphasis supplied).
13. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3470.1-.15 (Supp. 1960).
15. One important exception was that, whereas the Act of 1945 provided that
those dividends payable in the shares of the declaring corporation would always
go to principal, the 1947 Act stated that only those shares of the corporation which
are of the "same kind and rank" as those held by the trustee are so allocable. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3470.3 (1), 3470.5 (1) (Supp. 1960).
16. In Re Jones' Estate, 377 Pa. 473, 105 A2d 353 (1954); In Re Steele's
Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954); In Re Pew's Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67
A.2d 129 (1949).
17. For the reader who is not thoroughly familiar with this area of the law,
it might be an aid to understanding if we briefly review the fundamental tenets of
the Pennsylvania rule in the light of its successor, the Uniform Principal and
Income Act. The three stock transactions in the instant case provide an appropriate
basis for this review.
Under the Pennsylvania rule an "apportionable event" was said to occur in four
situations: (1) the distribution by the corporation of an "extraordinary" cash or
stock dividend; (2) the liquidation of the corporation; (3) the sale of the stock
by the trustee; (4) the issuance of stock rights. In Re Cunningham's Estate, 395
Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959). In July of 1948, the trustee sold two hundred of the
corporate shares held by him. By virtue of the definition above, an "apportionable
event" had clearly occurred. In the case of In Re Waterhouse's Estate, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized the rule with respect to such a sale as
follows:
"(c) Where stock that produces income owned by the estate is sold for a price
greater than the intact value and such greater price is due to an accumulation of
income, the proceeds are apportionable; that is, so much of the proceeds as neces-
[VOL. 7
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The Commissioners who promulgated the original Uniform Principal
and Income Act, in referring to the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportion-
ment, observed: "Experience has shown that, however praiseworthy the
intent, the [Pennsylvania] rule is unworkable, since neither trustee nor
court has the means to value the corporate assets in such a way as to
sary to preserve the intact value goes to the trustees for the corpus, and only so much
of the balance that represents income goes to the life tenant
"But where the greater value is due to the stock's earning power, good will,
or its intrinsic, speculative, or enhanced market value, all of the proceeds are part
of the corpus and belong to the remainderman; the increase is capital gain.
"The presumption is that the proceeds from the sale of stock belong to the
corpus of the trust and the burden of proving that they do not rests on the person
asserting a claim to them." In Re Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 Atl.
295, 296 (1932).
The Orphans' Court in the instant case found that the life tenants had
failed to overcome the presumption in favor of the corpus. By affirming the
lower court's determination, it would seem that the Supreme Court confirmed the
appellees' contention that, for apportionment purposes, a gain is the difference between
the carrying value of the stock on the books of the trust, i.e., the market value
at the time of acquisition, and the amount realized from the sale. It is not based
on book value, as was claimed by the appellants. This holding is consistent with
the facts since the carrying value of the two hundred shares exceeded the proceeds
from their sale by $6546.90. The Principal and Income Act, which will henceforth
be applicable to all similar situations in Pennsylvania, provides that, "Any profit
or loss resulting from the sale or liquidation of corporate shares shall enure to or
fall upon principal" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(3) (Supp. 1960).
One of the "events" classified as "apportionable" under the Pennsylvania rule is
the distribution by the corporation of an "extraordinary cash or stock dividend."
That language appears simple enough, but it might reasonably be asked: Does
"extraordinary" modify both "cash" and "stock" dividend, or merely the former?
The auditing judge in the instant case declared that "all of the decisions of our
Courts hold that the distribution by the corporation of a stock dividend is an
apportionable event" 22 Pa. D.&C.2d 701, 715 (1960). No cases were cited to
support that proposition, but it was on that authority that the lower court held
the four small stock dividends to be apportionable. On appeal, the life tenants
contended that there was no precedent to justify an apportionment unless it was
"extraordinary" in nature, that the four dividends in question were not "extra-
ordinary," and that "where amounts of stock dividends are small enough and
where it would not be worth the accounting effort to apportion them, such stock
dividends should be treated as ordinary cash dividends." Brief for Appellant, p. 20,
In Re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A2d 86 (1961). In every pertinent case
since Earp's Appeal, the distribution of a cash dividend, "ordinary" in nature,
has been acknowledged to be the property of those entitled to the income of the
trust. In Re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 Ad. 28 (1937); In Re Nirdlinger's
Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927). The rationale of the courts has been
that, since the intervals between the declarations of such dividends are so brief and
the sums involved so small, the denial of apportionment would result in no great
injustice, and would moreover avoid the difficulty of ascertaining the precise amount
of corporate earnings which accrued during these periods. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368(1859). To lend credence to their analogy the appellants made reference to a con-
curring and dissenting opinion rendered by Justice Bell in Cunningham Estate,
wherein he proposed that all ordinary stock dividends "which are paid quarterly,
semi-annually or annually, currently or irregularly, and do not exceed 6% in any
one year," be deemed income. 395 Pa. 1, 34, 149 A.2d 72, 89 (1959). The Supreme Court,
evidently persuaded by Bell's logic, reversed the lower court's determination of this
issue in the instant case, and held that the appellants were entitled to each of the
small stock dividends. It is clear that the six percent rule was not intended to
apply to stock dividends which are now subject to the Principal and Income Act.
Section 5 of that legislation is lucid in providihg that all stock dividends of the
same company and class shall be principal. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 3470.5 (Supp.
1 960/1he final subject of adjudication in the instant case involved the declaration by
the corporation of a 50% stock dividend (the so-called "one and one-half for one"
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secure the fair adjustment aimed at."' 8 That statement is as valid today
as when utttered in 1931. It also serves to illustrate the obvious fact that,
while the Pennsylvania formula in theory provides the ultimate in equitable
distribution, it too often has proved cumbersome and inadequate when
removed from the realm of abstract concepts to the reality of administra-
tion. To compel the trustee or court to ascertain the just apportionment
rate is most impractical in view of the complexity of modern corporate
operations. It would seem that the intolerable situation was only made
more acute by the holding in Crawford Estate. By virtue of that
decision the administrators of trusts in Pennsylvania were required to face
the onerous task of applying one standard to those trusts created prior
to the passage of the 1945 Act, another to those established between
the 1945 and 1947 enactments, 19 and still a third to those created there-
after. It is not difficult to understand why the auditing judge in the
instant case was prompted to label that situation as an "apportionment
morass."20 Although it be conceded that expediency is of itself no justi-
split). That distribution was financed by a transfer on the corporate books from
the capital and earned surplus accounts to the capital stock account. The life
tenants alleged that the Pennsylvania rule was applicable in this situation and that
the proceeds of the split were therefore subject to an apportionment. It was their
contention that, since more than sufficient funds had been transferred from earned
surplus to capital surplus to support the transfer from the capital surplus account
to the capital stock account, and since sufficient earnings accrued while the shares
were held by the trustee to equal or exceed the full amount placed in the capital
stock account, this transaction should be deemed an apportionable event. The courts
of first instance and last appeal, both citing Cunningham Estate as controlling, em-
phatically rejected the appellants' conclusion and held that the apportionment con-
cept could neither be extended nor interpreted so as to embrace the type of divi-
dend at issue. In Cunningham, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied that a
stock distribution which was supported in part by a transfer from capital surplus
to the capital stock account, constituted an apportionable event. The appellants' attempt to
circumvent that precedent by suggesting that the capital surplus account be broken
down into component parts to ascertain its source was rebuffed by both courts on
the grounds that any conclusion with respect to such an inquiry would be founded
purely on speculation. It is clear that, since the Principal and Income Act has
adopted the Massachusetts Rule of Apportionment, all litigation subsequent to the
instant case and involving a stock dividend essentially the same as the one herein
discussed shall be decided in favor of the corpus of the trust.
18. 9B UNiF. LAWS ANN., Commissioners' Prefatory Note to Principal and
Income Act (1957).
19. Although the 1947 Law substantially re-enacted its predecessor, it did so with
certain modifications. For example, § 3470.3(1) and § 3470.5(1) provide that
dividends on corporate shares, payable in shares of the declaring corporation itself,
belong to principal only when those shares are "of the same kind and rank as the
shares on which such dividend is paid." The 1945 Act did not so limit the principal's
interest, but provided that the remaindermen were entitled to any stock dividend
payable in the shares of the declaring corporation. Thus, if the 1947 Act had not
been accorded retroactive application, a trust created in 1946, which was the re-
cipient of a dividend payable in the shares of the declaring corporation, would be
subject to the 1945 provision and the remaindermen would receive the benefit of
that dividend even if the shares were of 4 different class than those already held
by the trust. If the same dividend were declared after 1947, however, that dividend
would be subject to the provisions of the second Act and would therefore accrue to
income. By the granting of retroactive effect to the Act of 1947, the trustees and
courts were emancipated from the burdensome process of being compelled to apply
to each trust the law which happened to be in effect at the time the trust was
created.
20. 22 Pa. D.&C.2d 701, 708 (1960).
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fication, it would seem that the Supreme Court's rejection of the con-
stitutional argument advanced by it in Crawford has in effect relieved much
of the confusion. The trustees and courts have in great measure been
emancipated from their involvement with complex accounting procedures,
and need only apply the relatively simple regulations set forth in the
Principal and Income Act.2 1 But the question remains, whether the solution
is a defensible one. The life tenants vigorously asserted that, notwithstand-
ing certain deficiencies of the Pennsylvania rule, the retroactive application
of the Principal and Income Act to a trust created prior to its enactment
would violate due process of law in that such application would be an
abridgement of their vested property rights. The validity of their argu-
ment on this issue must necessarily be the determining factor in the
instant case. The appellants relied heavily upon Crawford Estate in con-
tending that their property right vests not merely in the "income" of
the trust, but, more specifically, that it vests in the accumulated unpaid
earnings of the corporation. This is so, they said, because at the time
of the trust's creation, the courts determined what share of the trust
res belonged to "income" by calculating what percentage of it represented
such earnings. It was their position that no other method could subse-
quently be employed by the courts to measure that income. In essence,
the life tenants were claiming a vested property right in the Pennsylvania
rule; they were asserting a vested interest in a method of interpretation.
If their claim be correct and their assertion true, there is no justification
for the present holding.
The cases cited in Crawford and in the instant case to support the
proposition that, to give retroactive effect to the Act would violate the
due process provisions of the state constitution, 22 were cases concerned
with interference with rights in property,23 not with rights to a rule of
law and a method of interpretation. No authority was cited in either
case to indicate that the federal constitution would be infringed upon. In
only two other jurisdictions where the Principal and Income Act is law,
have the courts been confronted with substantially the same problem as
is presented here. Fortunately, however, the precedent is as illuminating
as it is scant. In July of 1957, the state of Wisconsin adopted the Uni-
form Act, which by its terms was made applicable to trusts already in
21. There is a certain minority of cases to which the Principal and Income
Act does not apply, e.g., those which involve apportionable events that occurred
prior to the passage of the Act and which might still be appealed. Situations of that
nature will be considered presently.
22. PA. CoNST. art. I, §§ 1, 9.
23. Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521(1947) (a statute was held unconstitutional because, inter alia, it effected a dep-
rivation of vested property rights for a non-public use) ; Palairet's Appeal, 67
Pa. 479 (1871) (a statute which provided for the extinguishment of ground rents
was held invalid since it effected a deprivation of vested property rights for a
non-public use) ; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86 (1847) (a statute which replaced
will-appointed trustees was held invalid).
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existence.2 4 In the case of In Re Allis' Will,25 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that life tenants under a trust created at a time when the
courts were applying the Pennsylvania rule were not deprived of any
vested right in property due to the retroactive application of the Act.
It was the opinion of the Wisconsin tribunal that, since there were
widely divergent views prevailing as to the respective merits of the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rules when the testatrix used the word
"income" in her will, it is most unlikely that she intended to adopt either
standard with respect to stock dividends. It is logical to assume that,
in the absence of any express language calling for a particular method of
allocation, the testatrix intended that such allocation should be made in
accordance with the law on the subject as established from time to time
by court decision or legislative enactment. In rejecting the whole rationale
of Crawford, the Wisconsin court stated:
It is fundamental that the life beneficiary possessed no vested
property right in the earnings of a corporation, shares of whose stock
constituted part of the portfolio of investments of the trust at the
time of the enactment of the Wisconsin Uniform Principal and In-
come Act, prior to a declaration of a dividend by the board of
directors payable therefrom. In Re Estate of Gerlach, 1922, 177 Wis.
251, 256, 188 N.W. 94. We consider it to be equally clear that
she also has no vested property right in the rule with respect to
any stock dividends subsequently declared without violating the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 8
Prior to April of 1954, the state courts of Kentucky adhered to the so-
called Kentucky Rule of Apportionment. That rule provided that all
extraordinary corporate dividends be awarded in their entirety to the
life tenant without regard to whether they were distributed in cash or
in stock, or whether they represented earnings that accumulated wholly
before or wholly after, or partly before or partly after, the commencement
of the trust. In 1954, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in the case
of Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r.,27 rejected the prevailing standard and in its
stead adopted the Massachusetts rule. In so doing, the court administered
the new doctrine to a trust which had been in existence since 1931. Sub-
sequently, in Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Company v. Hulette,28 the
Kentucky court was confronted with a situation in which the trustee
had been the recipient of certain cash distributions due to a corporate
liquidation. In the will establishing the trust, the testatrix had stipulated
that the "entire income" should go to the life tenants. At the time of
the will's execution and the testatrix's death, the Kentucky rule was in
force. This meant that if any cash proceeds had then been received as
24. Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 231.40(1)-(12) (Supp. 1961).
25. 6 Wis.2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959).
26. 6 Wis.2d 14, 94 N.W.2d 226, 232 (1959).
27. 267 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954).
28. 293 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1956).
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the result of a liquidation, the "income" of the trust would have been
entitled to it. In holding that the cash proceeds must be distributed in
accordance with the Massachusetts rule, and thereby reaffirming its Bowles
decision, the court stated:
In the absence of any provisions in the will which could lead to
a different interpretation, we must presume the testatrix intended any
legal difficulties of construction arising under her will to be solved
according to the prevailing legal principles applicable to changed con-
ditions.29
The court further declared:
To say that the lifeless hand of Mrs. Boggs [the testatrix] should
bind us to a legal concept of 'income', as it existed in her lifetime,
in other lawsuits is asking too much. The function of the courts
in seeking justice in the light of changing times and concepts would
largely be stultified if the legal effect of words used in a will in
one generation should create a vested right in that construction with
respect to other wills and other parties.30
The rationale of the Wisconsin and Kentucky courts is fundamentally
sound, as well as directly in point. When Daniel Catherwood created
the trust in 1924, his stipulation was that the net income should be
distributed to the designated life tenants. He made no mention of
the manner in which that income was to be determined. Furthernore,
at the time he initiated the trust, there was a great divergence of opinion
with respect to which method of allocation was superior. There would,
therefore, seem to be no basis upon which one could conclude, either
from reason or from the express language of the settlor himself, that
he intended that the income forever be measured in accordance with the
Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment. How then can it logically be in-
ferred that the life tenants had a vested interest in that rule? The court
in the instant case was quick to emphasize that, of all the states which
had adopted the Principal and Income Act, only Pennsylvania had held
that its retroactive application is unconstitutional. It would appear that,
by virtue of the present decision, the Commonwealth can hereafter dis-
claim so dubious a distinction.
While it would not be unsound to maintain that the instant case
restored order and reason to a field where complexity and confusion reigned
supreme, it would be prudent to at least be mindful of the problems raised
by it. Many are of fundamental significance to Pennsylvania practitioners
and should be given careful consideration by them.8 ' For purposes of
29. Id. at 462.
30. Id. at 463.
31. For a useful review of a number of these problems, see Fiduciary Review,
Sept., 1961, Pp. 1, 2, 3.
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the present discussion, however, it would be of doubtful value to dwell
upon them, and, therefore, we will note but two. The first is a product
of the following language employed by the court to declare that its
decision would take effect prospectively: "In all audits now pending and
henceforth, distributions shall be made under the provisions of the Prin-
cipal and Income Act of 1947. ' '82 Due to the absence of uniformity in
local practice, some doubt exists as to the intended scope of the words,
"all aud'ts now pending." It is clear that a precise definition should be
formulated so as to avoid the confusion which has resulted from the
varying interpretations. A second question arising out of the present
case relates to the so-called "six-percent rule" as applied to stock divi-
dends. As originally proposed by Mr. Justice Bell in Cunningham Estate,
and as adopted by the court in the instant case, the rule stipulates that
when a total stock distribution for the current year is payable at the
rate of 6% or less of the corporation's outstanding shares before such
distributions were made, such distributions in stock of the distributing
corporation should be treated as income.83 This, of course, is a sub-
stantial departure from Pennsylvania's common law doctrine. Mr. Justice
Bell sought to justify it, however, on the grounds that an apportionment
of such distributions not only avoided the testator's dominant intention
that his widow or children benefit from the small stock dividends, but
that it resulted in costly and vexatious litigation. Without questioning
the validity of that rationale, it might be worthy of note that the newly
adopted rule will make possible the revival of certain litigation. The
Pennsylvania Fiduciaries Act of 1949 provides that any party in interest
may petition for a review of a fiduciary's account, auditor's report, ad-
judication or decree of distribution within five years after the final con-
firmation of the account is clear, so long as none of the property involved
has been distributed by the personal representative in accordance with a
decree of court before the filing of the petition.3 4 Since it would seem
that the "six-percent rule" was intended to govern stock dividends de-
clared prior to May 3, 1945, as well as those involved in the instant
case, any account which concerned such a dividend, and which has been
adjudicated within the past five years, is subject to appeal on the basis
of the rule. A possible insight into the future significance of the "six-
percent rule" might be had by observing that, while it clearly does not
now apply to those cases within the purview of the Principal and Income
Act, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently proposed
that the various states amend their Acts in order that it could be so
applied.3 5 A policy on the part of four or five hundred major companies
32. In Re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 78, 173 A.2d 86, 94 (1961).
33. Mr. Justice Bell is not in favor of restricting the rule to only those stock
dividends which are composed of the stock of the issuing corporation. He is also
against requiring them to be of the same class.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.721 (1950).
35. Commissioners' second tentative draft of a proposed RvlSXD UNIFORM
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 5.
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now to pay either as a substitute for or in addition to cash dividends a
small regular stock dividend, was cited as the reason for the proposed
change. Should the Pennsylvania State Legislature subsequently follow
the Commissioners' suggestion and incorporate their proposal into its
Principal and Income Act, it is conceivable that life tenants in the Common-
wealth might once again be able to survey the field of dividend apportion-
ment with objective eyes.
Matthew F. McHugh
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